Texas’s Transitioning Judiciary
A Few Appellate & Ethical Considerations

By Michael J. Ritter

San Antonio Bar Association
Brown Bag Lunch Series
January 17, 2019
TEXAS’S TRANSITIONING JUDICIARY:
A FEW APPELLATE & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

BY MICHAEL J. RITTER*

*Staff Attorney at the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas; Board Certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization in Civil Appellate Law and Criminal Appellate Law; creator of the 4th Court of Appeals Update Blog, www.4thcourtupdates.com; President of the Texas Association of Appellate Court Attorneys. J.D., with honors, The University of Texas School of Law; B.A., Trinity University. This article represents my personal views and not the views of my employer.

This month, due to retirements and the 2018 judicial elections, Texas welcomed an historic number of new judges in trial and appellate courts.¹ In both civil and criminal cases, a change in judgeship can raise questions about what a new judge may or may not do, and about the impact the change in judgeship might have on pending proceedings in the appellate court. This article attempts to address some of those questions and identify potential ethical issues that might arise as a result of a change in judgeship in both civil and criminal cases.

Although Texas’s “judiciary” (as used in this article’s title) technically includes officials other than judges (such as elected prosecutors, constables, clerks, sheriffs, and even state bar officers),² this article focuses primarily on appellate and ethical considerations that can arise with a change in judgeship in trial and appellate courts in both civil and criminal cases. The number of changes in judges resulting from retirements and the 2018 judicial elections prompted this article, but this article can be helpful whenever any new or a different judge takes office, whether due to a regular or special election, appointment, or through a rotating docket or presiding system. However, different rules apply when a successor judge takes office after a prior judge dies, resigns, or becomes disabled.³

Generally speaking, a change in judgeship fundamentally does not increase or decrease the trial court’s authority or responsibilities, or a party’s appellate options. But such a change can alter or modify how attorneys use existing appellate options and provide an occasion for lawyers to re-familiarize themselves with those appellate options. This article takes no position on the prudence or propriety of these options in any particular case or category of cases, and is intended to inform readers on case law and relevant rules.

The appellate considerations that this article addresses are: (1) having a newly elected trial judge reconsider a ruling, order, or judgment of a prior judge; (2)

---


² TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 18, 20, 21, 23 (providing for elected constables, county clerks, county attorneys, district attorneys, and sheriffs within the state’s “Judicial Department”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.011(a)–(c) (providing for state bar directors and officers within the judicial agency).

³ TEX. R. CIV. P. 18.
appealing or seeking extraordinary relief in an appellate court if a trial judge does reconsider or refuses to reconsider a ruling, order, or judgment of the prior judge; and (3) having newly elected appellate justices reconsider a prior order or judgment of the appellate court. In addition to these appellate options, this article highlights other appellate issues that have arisen with a change in judgeship. In discussing these topics, this article highlights potential ethical issues that can arise in pursuing appellate options with a newly elected trial or appellate court judge. This article also touches briefly on newly elected prosecutors, but begins with reconsideration in the trial court.

I

RECONSIDERATION IN THE TRIAL COURT

If a party desires to challenge a trial court’s ruling, order, or judgment, one of the first appellate considerations is whether the party must or may seek further redress in the trial court first. Generally, for state courts, Texas law regards the trial court as an office, and does not distinguish between officeholders. When a newly elected judge holds the office of the trial court, the new judge generally has the same authority and responsibilities as the prior judge. The difference is that the parties have a different decisionmaker exercising the authority and executing the responsibilities of that office. This difference raises the question as to whether a party may seek reconsideration of the prior ruling, order, or judgment in the trial court and whether, to preserve error for an appeal, the party must do so before seeking relief in an appellate court. This article refers to the former as “discretionary reconsideration,” and the latter as “mandatory reconsideration.”

A. Mandatory Reconsideration

Reconsideration is not mandatory to preserve error for a direct appeal. As discussed in Part IV.A of this article, reconsideration might be required if a party has pursued extraordinary relief in an original proceeding in an appellate court. Typically, for purposes of a direct appeal, if a party has preserved error regarding a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment, the party need not preserve error again after the newly elected trial judge takes office. Error preservation rules, which are (at the most basic level) the same in civil and criminal cases, typically require a ruling by the trial court. Once the trial court has ruled on the complaint, objection, or motion, error preservation rules generally do not require a subsequent ruling by the new trial judge.

---

4 Texas appellate courts usually refer to a trial judge’s official actions as done by the “trial court.” However, the Court of Criminal Appeals generally refers to actions of the “trial judge” for readability, and when considering original proceedings that typically involve seeking relief against the officeholder instead of from an appealed order or judgment.

5 In re Wolff, 231 S.W.3d 466, 470–71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding a newly elected judge abused his discretion by failing to conduct de novo hearing of matter decided by an associate judge when the prior judge was in office).

6 See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R. EVID. 103.
In other words, if a party desires to appeal a prior judge’s order or judgment, and has preserved a complaint for appellate review regarding that prior judge’s order or judgment, reconsideration of the order or judgment by the new trial judge is not mandatory. Conversely, if the trial court has already ruled or signed an order or judgment and a party has not preserved error, then the party might be unable to preserve error regarding the prior ruling, order, or judgment unless the new judge actually reconsiders the ruling, order, or judgment in light of the party’s further request, objection, or motion as discussed in Part I.C. Consequently, while the election of a new judge might not require reconsideration to preserve error, it might create an opportunity to pursue the new judge’s discretionary reconsideration by which a party may preserve error that was previously not preserved.

B. Discretionary Reconsideration

Although a party is not required to re-preserve a previously-preserved complaint for appellate review after a newly elected judge takes office, a party might be able to seek a newly elected judge’s reconsideration of a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment while the trial court has plenary power. One case that exemplifies discretionary reconsideration is State v. $50,600.00. In State v. $50,600.00, after the newly elected trial judge took office, the new judge sua sponte vacated an agreed judgment that the prior judge had rendered, and then rendered a new judgment. On appeal, the new judgment was challenged on two bases: (1) the trial court lacked authority to render the new judgment; and (2) the trial court erred by rendering the new judgment. Although State v. $50,600.00 is a civil asset forfeiture case, the same general principles might apply in criminal cases.

State v. $50,600.00 demonstrates that even if a newly elected trial judge has the authority reconsider or vacate a prior order or judgment while the trial court has plenary power, doing so may be appropriate in some cases and inappropriate in others. The court of appeals in State v. $50,600.00 held the trial court had the authority to render the new judgment because the new judgment was rendered within thirty days of the day that the prior judge rendered the agreed final judgment. However, the court of appeals held that the trial court nevertheless erred by rendering the new judgment because it did not conform to the parties’ pleadings. Thus, under State v. $50,600.00, a newly elected trial judge can reconsider a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment so long as the trial court retains plenary power, and the new ruling, order, or judgment could be reviewed on appeal for compliance with the applicable substantive law. Although State v. $50,600.00 demonstrates two steps of discretionary reconsideration in the trial court, there are

---

7 This might be the case because the complaint, objection, or motion or grounds therefor will not have been timely. An untimely objection does not preserve error for review. See TEX. R. APP. 33.1(a)(1) (requiring that the complaint, objection, or motion be made “timely”).
8 800 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh’g).
9 Id. at 874.
10 Id. at 876–77.
11 Id. at 876.
12 Id. at 876–77.
at other legal and ethical consideration in seeking a newly elected trial judge’s reconsideration of the prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment.

1. Is the new judge recused, disqualified, or otherwise prohibited from acting?

In any case, an issue that can arise when any trial judge first considers a matter is disqualification or recusal. If a judge is disqualified from the case, the judge’s orders or rulings are void and error need not be preserved to challenge the actions of a disqualified judge. If a judge should have recused from the case, error must be preserved in the trial court to raise the issue on appeal. However, even if a new judge is not recused or disqualified, a new judge may otherwise be prohibited from reconsidering a ruling, order, or judgment if the order has been appealed and, in civil cases, the appellate court has issued a stay or, in criminal cases, the record on appeal has been filed. If the new judge is not disqualified or recused, and is otherwise able to rule, the next question is whether the trial court retains plenary power over the case.

2. Does the trial court still have plenary power?

As previously noted, Texas law generally treats the trial court as an office and, for most appellate matters, does not distinguish between officeholders. With a few exceptions, if the former judge could have reconsidered the ruling, order, or judgment, then the new judge may do so; if the former judge could not have reconsidered the ruling, order, or judgment, the new judge may not do so. Thus, if the new judge is not disqualified or recused, the next question is whether the trial court, as an office, retains the legal authority to act.

The trial court’s legal authority to act is usually referred to as the trial court’s plenary power. In civil cases, a trial court has plenary power over case for thirty days after the trial court signs a final judgment. In criminal cases, a trial court has plenary power over the case for thirty days after the trial court either dismisses the

---

13 TEX. CONST. art. V § 11; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 30.01–3.08. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a, 18b.

14 Davis v. Crist Indus., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (“If, however, the complaint is that the judge acted in a case without statutory or procedural authority, the alleged error is not void, but voidable, and must therefore be raised by objection or complaint to be preserved for appellate review.”); Mata v. State, 991 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. ref’d) (“The actions of a judge without authority are void if the judge is either disqualified, or is not qualified. Otherwise, the actions are merely voidable and must have been objected to in order to be preserved for appeal.”) (citation omitted).

15 See Davis, 98 S.W.3d at 342; Mata, 991 S.W.2d at 902.

16 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(b), (c), (e).

17 See Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding actions taken by the trial judge after the record on appeal is filed are null and void).


19 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a); Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend, 540 S.W.3d at 581.
charges, or imposes or suspends the defendant’s sentence. In all cases, if a party files a proper, timely post-judgment motion, the trial court retains plenary power until thirty days after the post-judgment is denied by the trial court or is overruled by operation of law seventy-five days after the final judgment was signed or after sentence is suspended or imposed. After the trial court loses plenary power, a new judge may not set aside a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment in that same proceeding. However, in civil cases, a new trial judge may set aside a prior judge’s ruling if a timely filed bill of review establishes sufficient cause. In criminal cases, a new trial judge may set aside a prior judge’s order or judgment if the defendant/applicant is entitled to habeas relief.

3. Should the new trial judge reconsider the prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment?

If a new trial judge is not disqualified or recused, and the trial court retains plenary power over the case and is otherwise able to act, the next question is whether the trial judge should reconsider the prior judge’s action. There are varying views about the propriety of a newly elected judge reconsidering the prior judge’s rulings, orders, and judgments. No view is necessarily correct or incorrect. Rather, these views are generally formed by the individual officeholder weighing the sometimes-competing goals of promoting judicial efficiency, protecting institutional legitimacy, and ensuring justice for the parties. Factors that can weigh against reconsidering a prior judge’s ruling include: (1) using additional judicial resources to hold another hearing to reconsider a matter that has already been heard and decided by another elected judge; (2) if applicable, avoiding the perception that the newly elected judge’s political affiliation or opposition to the prior judge motivated the change; and (3) in counties that have a rotating docket or presiding system, the need for comity among the judges not to disturb other judges’ decisions, regardless of whether they are newly elected judges or not.

On the other hand, one factor that could weigh in favor of reconsideration by the new judge is that the party seeking reconsideration reasonably believed a prior judge would not have been amenable to the argument. One example of such an issue might be the issue of a prior judge’s recusal. Other examples of the prior judge not being amenable to a particular argument will likely be likewise case- and judge-specific. That said, any explanation for why counsel failed to raise an argument or issue before a prior judge might require that the new judge to assess the credibility of counsel’s explanation. In presenting such an explanation, counsel should keep in mind Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.03, which

---

20 See Davis, 349 S.W.3d at 537.
21 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c) (civil rule); TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(a), (c) (criminal rule).
22 TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).
24 See, e.g., Bank of Tex., N.A., Trustee v. Mexia, 135 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (providing an example of a party waiting until after a prior judge left office to raise an issue with the prior judge’s disqualification/recusal).
prohibits lawyers from knowingly making false statements of material facts to a tribunal.\textsuperscript{25}

Depending upon the case, the biggest factor weighing in favor of reconsidering a prior judge’s decision, however, might be ensuring justice is served when the prior judge’s ruling appears to be erroneous and the ruling might a significant impact either on the case going forward or on the aggrieved party. Although the aggrieved party might have options available in the appellate court, a newly elected trial judge might conclude those appellate options are or could be inadequate under the circumstances. Different judges might weigh these factors differently, resulting in some judges almost never reconsidering a prior judge’s actions and some judges frequently reconsidering the prior judge’s actions depending upon the circumstances. However, if the trial court retains plenary power and the newly elected judge is not disqualified or recused and is otherwise able to act, a newly elected judge’s decision to reconsider a prior order is, as if the newly elected judge were the former judge, entirely discretionary in most cases.

4. \textit{What is the proper scope of a new trial judge’s permissive reconsideration?}

If a newly elected judge exercises their\textsuperscript{26} discretion to reconsider the prior judge’s ruling, then the new judge must determine whether the prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment was proper. As demonstrated by \textit{State} v. \$50,600.00, determining whether a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment was proper requires considering the pleadings, any evidence properly submitted, and the applicable law.\textsuperscript{27} A motion to reconsider might add further grounds and responses, and include additional evidence not included in the motion to be reconsidered. The trial court may (1) deny reconsideration altogether; (2) reconsider the prior motion on its original grounds, responses, and evidence; or (3) reconsider the prior motion on its original grounds and evidence and any new grounds raised and evidence submitted with the motion for reconsideration and response thereto.\textsuperscript{28} As explained in Part I.C, the option the new trial judge chooses can significantly affect the scope of appellate review if the trial court’s ruling, order, or judgment is subsequently challenged in an appellate court.

5. \textit{Further Limits on Discretionary Reconsideration}

In addition to the trial court losing plenary power or the trial judge being disqualified, recused, or otherwise unable to act based on the appellate posture of the case, there are some further limits on discretionary reconsideration. In civil cases, some motions, such as a motion to transfer venue, generally might not be

\textsuperscript{25} TEX. DISC. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.03(a)(1).


\textsuperscript{27} 800 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh’g).

subject to reconsideration.\textsuperscript{29} Other statutory or rule-based deadlines can preclude a newly elected trial judge from reconsidering a prior ruling, order, or judgment. Some motions have deadlines for filing and for the trial court to rule on those motions. In civil cases, these motions include a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA or the anti-SLAPP statute), and a motion for new trial. A Rule 91a motion must be filed within sixty days of service and ruled on within forty-five days of the Rule 91a motion being filed.\textsuperscript{30} A TCPA motion must be filed within sixty days of service and ruled on within thirty days of the hearing on the TCPA motion.\textsuperscript{31} In both civil and criminal cases, a motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days and ruled on within seventy-five days of the challenged judgment.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, a trial court might abuse its discretion by granting a motion to reconsider with further grounds or arguments, or reconsidering an order denying such a motion, outside of the applicable statutory or rule-based deadlines for filing and ruling on the motion.

C. Appellate Issues Regarding Trial Court Reconsideration

If a newly elected judge grants or denies a motion to reconsider, a few appellate issues might arise. As noted above, when ruling on a motion to reconsider, a trial court may (1) deny altogether; (2) reconsider the original motion on the original filings and evidence; or (3) reconsider the original motion in light of any new grounds raised in and evidence submitted with the motion for reconsideration and response.\textsuperscript{33} If a trial court’s order simply denies the motion to reconsider, the simple denial raises a rebuttable presumption that the trial court either did not reconsider the prior motion or that the trial court reconsidered the prior motion without considering any new grounds, responses, or evidence presented with the motion to reconsider.\textsuperscript{34} The presumption may be rebutted by an affirmative indication (such as statements the trial judge makes or recitations in the order) that the new trial judge actually considered the merits of the new grounds, responses, or evidence presented with the motion for reconsideration and response thereto.\textsuperscript{35} If the new trial judge’s order contains language such as “After considering the pleadings and evidence on file,” the court of appeals might presume in an appeal that the new trial judge reconsidered the motion in light of any new grounds and evidence presented in the motion to reconsider and response. Because the language in the trial court’s

\textsuperscript{29} \textsc{Tex. R. Civ. P.} 87.5.
\textsuperscript{30} \textsc{Tex. R. Civ. P.} 91a3(a)
\textsuperscript{31} \textsc{Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.003(b), 27.005(a)}.
\textsuperscript{32} Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 459, 467 n.5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (citing \textsc{Tex. R. App. P.} 21.4(b)) (stating the thirty-day deadline to file a motion for new trial cannot “be circumvented by filing a ‘motion to reconsider’ which contains new grounds and new evidence after the statutory deadline for an amended motion”); \textit{see generally} \textsc{Tex. R. Civ. P.} 329b.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{See id.}
order can affect the scope of an appellate court’s review, and the scope of the review may be outcome determinative in an appellate court proceeding, one might want to carefully review an order for such language before submitting, or approving the form of, an order on a motion to reconsider.

If a new trial judge denies a motion to reconsider a prior appealable interlocutory order, with or without considering additional arguments or evidence, the order denying the motion to reconsider might not restart the appellate deadlines for an interlocutory appeal. For instance, in a civil case, if a prior judge denied a plea to the jurisdiction, and a new judge denies a motion to reconsider that very same plea to the jurisdiction, this might not restart the clock for appealing the trial court’s denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. A similar rule might apply in criminal cases. For example, if a prior judge grants a motion to suppress, and the new judge denies a motion to reconsider, the new judge’s denial of the motion to reconsider might not restart the clock for appealing the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress.

Conversely, if a new trial judge grants a motion to reconsider and either grants or denies a prior motion, then the order granting the motion to reconsider might, in some cases, result in the entry of an appealable order or judgment. The trial court’s new order may constitute an interlocutory order that the party has the right to appeal. In a civil case, for example, if a new trial judge were to grant a motion to reconsider a motion for summary judgment denied by the prior judge and then grant the motion for summary judgment, a subsequently entered order granting the motion for summary judgment might be an appealable judgment. In a criminal case for example, if a new trial judge were to grant a motion to reconsider a motion to quash a charging instrument that was denied by the prior judge and then grant the motion to quash, a subsequently entered order dismissing some or all of the charges might be appealable.

D. Conclusion

In summary, if the trial court still has plenary power, the new trial judge is not disqualified or otherwise unable to act, and there is no other statutory or rule-based deadline for filing or ruling on a motion, a new judge usually has the discretion to reconsider or not reconsider the prior judge’s rulings, orders, and judgments. However, the new judge’s ruling, order, or judgment might be erroneous if the prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment was proper, unless a new valid ground or response or new material evidence is submitted and considered by the new judge. When a new trial judge does reconsider a prior judge’s action, the scope of the new judge’s reconsideration can also affect the scope of review in a subsequent appeal.

37 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a)(5); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(b).
38 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a).
39 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 44.01(a)(1), 44.02.
II OPTIONS FOR RELIEF IN THE APPELLATE COURT

If a newly elected trial judge reconsiders a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment, or declines to do so, the non-prevailing party might consider pursuing relief in an appellate court. Or, if a newly elected trial judge has a different view of the case and changes course of the proceedings from when the prior judge was presiding, there might be options for relief in the appellate court. The type of relief that can be sought in an appellate court, and the proper procedure for pursuing that relief, generally turns on whether the case is a civil or criminal case and whether the order to be appealed is an appealable interlocutory order or, in a civil case, a final judgment. In other words, if the ruling, order, or judgment is appealable, a direct appeal is generally available. If not, an original proceeding in an appellate court can sometimes be an option to seek extraordinary relief.

A. Direct Appeals

One option for challenging a trial court’s order or judgment is through a direct appeal. A “direct appeal” refers to the ordinary appellate process by which a party expresses its desire to challenge a trial court’s judgment or other appealable action in an appellate court, usually a court of appeals but in some rare circumstances in the Supreme Court of Texas or Court of Criminal Appeals.\(^{40}\) A party expresses its desire to challenge such appealable actions by filing a notice of appeal.\(^{41}\) This article uses the term appealable “action” for purposes of including appealable interlocutory orders, final judgments in civil cases, and an order terminating prosecution or imposing or suspending a sentence in criminal cases. “Courts of appeals” refer to the fourteen intermediate courts of appeals, and “appellate courts” include all courts of appeals, the Supreme Court of Texas, and the Court of Criminal Appeals.\(^{42}\)

1. Civil Appeals

In civil cases, direct appeals in the courts of appeals are limited to appealable interlocutory orders and final judgments.\(^{43}\) Appealability is ultimately an issue of appellate court jurisdiction, which generally corresponds with a party’s right to appeal.\(^{44}\) Courts of appeals’ jurisdiction is created by the Texas Constitution, which authorizes the Texas Legislature to confer courts with judicial authority and appellate jurisdiction. Because a party has no inherent or constitutional right to appeal, the Texas Legislature has given courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals by statutorily giving individuals the right to appeal certain orders and judgments.

\(^{40}\) See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.2(a), 57, 71.
\(^{41}\) See id. R. 25.1(d), 25.2(b).
\(^{42}\) See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.201; TEX. R. APP. P. 3.1(b).
\(^{43}\) See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 51.012, 51.014.
Generally, if a person has the right to appeal, the court of appeals’ jurisdiction is mandatory, and the court of appeals must hear and decide the case. The Legislature has given individuals the right to appeal from a final judgment and other specific interlocutory orders. As noted above, if a new trial judge reconsiders a prior judge’s ruling and changes course, the new judge’s order may constitute a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order.

a. Final Judgments

A party has a right to appeal from a final judgment. A “judgment” typically refers to an order that disposes of a party’s request for the ultimate relief sought in the case, either by denying, granting, or dismissing the request for relief. So, under this definition, all judgments are orders, but not all orders are judgments. The test for whether a judgment is final and appealable as a matter of right turns on the test set out by Lehnman v. Har-Con Corp. Under Lehnman, a judgment is “final” if: (1) it actually disposes of all claims and all parties in the lawsuit; or (2) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all parties and all claims. A judgment rendered after a conventional trial on the merits is presumed to be a final judgment, but that presumption may be rebutted by specific language in the judgment or by the record of the trial. If a newly elected trial judge grants the ultimately relief requested in a case, either before or after a conventional trial on the merits, the judgment might be final and appealable.

b. Appealable Interlocutory Orders & Permissive Appeals

If the order a party desires to appeal is not a final judgment, the order may be appealed if the Texas Legislature has provided the party the right to appeal the order. Most of the orders that a party may appeal as a matter of right are contained in section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. However, the Texas Legislature often buries the right to appeal within other statutes. So, if a newly elected trial judge signs an order, section 51.014 or other applicable statutes might provide the right to appeal that order. Also notable is that when the Legislature provides that a party “may” appeal, the use of the word “may” typically confers the right to appeal.

If the Legislature has not provided a right to appeal the order, there is an alternative discretionary procedure contained in section 51.014, specifically in

---

46 See id. § 51.012.
48 Id. at 192–93.
49 Id. at 198.
51 See, e.g., id. § 171.098 (providing the right to appeal certain orders regarding arbitration).
52 See id. §§ 51.012, 51.014.
subsections (d) through (f). In those provisions, the Texas Legislature deviated from the general rule of appeals as a matter of right, and corresponding mandatory jurisdiction for the courts of appeals, by providing an alternative, discretionary review procedure in the intermediate appellate courts. Under this discretionary review procedure, a party may seek permission from the trial court to appeal an otherwise non-appealable order or judgment. Generally, the trial court must conclude the order involves a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to a controlling question of law and that an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. If the trial court grants permission to appeal, the party desiring to appeal must timely file a petition for permissive appeal in the court of appeals; the court of appeals then has the discretion as to whether to take the case.

2. Criminal Appeals

In criminal cases, direct appeals are generally limited to the trial court’s imposition or suspension of the defendant’s sentence and appealable interlocutory orders. Unlike civil cases, in which the appealable action is the written order or judgment that is signed by the trial judge, when the appealable action in criminal cases is not the signing of an interlocutory order, the appealable action is the imposition or suspension of the defendant’s sentence. If a newly elected judge imposes or suspends sentence, then the imposition or suspension of the sentence is the appealable action.

If a newly elected judge changes course or otherwise makes another ruling, the appealability of the ruling turns on, initially, which party is seeking to appeal. A criminal defendant’s right to appeal is provided in article 44.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:

A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed, provided, however, before the defendant who has

---

53 See id. § 51.014(d)–(f).
54 See id. § 51.014(d).
55 The permissive appeal procedure is not a certified question procedure, but an ordinarily interlocutory appeal of an order that is not otherwise appealable. See Gulley v. State Farm Lloyds, 350 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (“Under our reading of the statute, section 51.014(d) does not contemplate use of an immediate appeal as a mechanism to present, in effect, a ‘certified question’ to this Court similar to the procedure used by federal appellate courts in certifying a determinative question of state law to the Texas Supreme Court.”).
56 See id. § 51.014(d).
57 See id. § 51.014(f). The Supreme Court of Texas is currently considering whether a court of appeals actually has discretion to refuse to hear a permissive appeal if it concludes there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Sabre Travel Int’l v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 17-0538 (Tex.) (oral argument held on Oct. 30, 2018)
58 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 44.01, 44.02.
60 See id. R. 21.4(b), 26.1(a)(1).
been convicted upon either his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere before the court and the court, upon the election of the defendant, assesses punishment and the punishment does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, he must have permission of the trial court, except on those matters which have been raised by written motion filed prior to trial.61

Interestingly, article 44.02 is different from the right to appeal conferred in civil cases and the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases because it provides, unlike all the other relevant statutory provisions, that the defendant has the right to appeal “under the rules hereinafter prescribed,” which appears to delegate to the Court of Criminal Appeals the authority to determine by rule what else a defendant may appeal.62 The Court of Criminal Appeals has, for example, promulgated Rule 31, which appears to authorize a criminal defendant to appeal certain bond and habeas rulings.63

The State may appeal as per article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 44.01 provides:

The state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order: (1) dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any portion of an indictment, information, or complaint; (2) arrests or modifies a judgment; (3) grants a new trial; (4) sustains a claim of former jeopardy; (5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, if jeopardy has not attached in the case and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the case; or (6) is issued under Chapter 64.64

In addition to articles 44.01 and 44.02, as in civil cases, the Legislature has buried statutory rights to appeal within different statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure.65 So, if a newly elected trial judge changes course from the prior judge and signs an order, articles 44.01 and 44.02 and other applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure might provide the right to appeal for that particular order.

3. **Further Review in the Supreme Court of Texas & Court of Criminal Appeals**

After the court of appeals decides a direct appeal, further appellate options exist in the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals.66 The procedure for pursuing further appellate relief in civil cases is by petition for review in the

---

61 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02.
62 See id.
64 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01.
65 See, e.g., id. art. 64.05.
The typical procedure for pursuing further appellate relief in criminal cases is by petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Although the procedure for criminal cases includes the word “discretionary” and the civil procedure does not, both procedures are discretionary review procedures and the high courts may decline to grant review in their sole discretion.

B. Extraordinary Relief

Another option for challenging a trial court’s ruling, order, or judgment is by initiating an original proceeding in an appellate court and seeking extraordinary relief. “Extraordinary relief” typically refers to the issuance of an extraordinary writ, including writs of mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, and others. A party may request that an appellate court issue an extraordinary writ by filing a petition in an appellate court, and equitable principles generally govern those original proceedings. Technically speaking, extraordinary relief may first be sought in the supreme court or Court of Criminal Appeals because the proceedings are “original” proceedings. But because the high courts will generally deny relief if a party has not first pursued relief in the court of appeals or showed that extraordinary circumstances justified not having done so, the typical practice is to pursue extraordinary relief in the court of appeals.

The standards governing the issuance of extraordinary writs depend on the type of writ sought and whether the case is a civil or criminal case. Although there are other extraordinary writs, this article focuses on three: mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus. The purpose or function of writs of mandamus and prohibition are generally the same regardless of the type of case; a writ of mandamus compels an official to take an action, whereas a writ of prohibition prohibits an official from taking an action. Writs of mandamus and prohibition are closely related and are governed by similar standards. Conversely, a writ of habeas corpus serves the purpose of challenging an order under which an individual is confined for being in contempt of court.

1. Writs of Habeas Corpus

One issue that can arise with any change in judgeship is a change in courtroom expectations. Although parties sometimes violate a judge’s expectations, rules, or orders for courtroom conduct, judges in Texas tend to be somewhat reluctant to hold parties and attorneys in contempt. But it does happen occasionally. When a trial judge errs by holding a party or lawyer in contempt, an original proceeding in

---

67 See id. R. 53.
68 See id. R. 66.
69 See id. R. 52.1.
71 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52, 72.
72 See In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d at 297–98.
an appellate is the usual appellate remedy. If the party or lawyer is not confined as a result of an order of contempt, the appropriate writ to seek is a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. If the party or lawyer is confined as a result of a contempt order, the appropriate writ to seek is a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals in civil cases or the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal cases. 73

The standards governing the issuance of writs of habeas corpus are generally the same regardless of whether the underlying case in which the contempt order arises is a civil case or a criminal case. “A criminal contempt conviction for violation of a court order requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of: (1) a reasonably specific order; (2) a violation of the order; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order.” 74

2. Writs of Mandamus & Prohibition in Criminal Appeals

In criminal appeals, the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition are governed by the same general principles. 75 The relator must show: (1) a clear right to relief; and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy at law (or by appeal). 76 The first requirement generally mandates that the relator establish the trial judge had a mandatory duty to do something or refrain from doing something, but failed to comply with that duty. This first requirement is alternatively phrased as an “abuse of discretion.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the modifier “clear” in the “clear right to relief” requirement is not a superfluous term; the alleged abuse of discretion must be clear as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. If it is unclear from the record what exactly the trial judge did or failed to do, or if the law that applies to what the trial judge did is unclear, then a request for an extraordinary writ of mandamus or prohibition must be denied. 77 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has framed the first requirement as an abuse of discretion, the most frequent abuse of discretion alleged is the misapplication of the law or a failure to apply the law, issues that are reviewed de novo.

For the second requirement, there must be no adequate remedy at law (or by appeal). “In some cases, a remedy at law may technically exist but may nevertheless be so uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate, or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate.” 78 “To establish no adequate remedy by appeal, the relator must show there is no adequate remedy at law to address the alleged harm and that the act requested is a ministerial act, not involving a


77 Id.

78 In re Ford, 553 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, orig. proceeding).
discretionary or judicial decision.”79 In criminal cases, Texas courts often note, “The extraordinary nature of the writ of prohibition requires caution in its use.”80 And they mean it. As a result, a writ of mandamus or prohibition might not issue to address a newly elected judge’s abuse of discretion in criminal cases unless the case is truly extraordinary. The same cannot be said for civil appeals.

3. Writs of Mandamus & Prohibition in Civil Appeals

To obtain mandamus relief in civil cases, the relator must show: (1) the trial judge abused their discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.81 Counterintuitively, although the first requirement for these extraordinary writs in civil and criminal appeals are phrased differently, they are very similar tests in application. And, although the second requirement is phrased almost identically in both the civil and criminal contexts, the standards for what constitutes lacking an adequate remedy at law or by appeal are very different.

In civil appeals, the first requirement is a “clear” abuse of discretion. Like criminal appeals, this issue ultimately boils down to whether the trial judge misapplied the law, failed to apply the law correctly, or failed to perform a ministerial duty, such as by failing to rule on a properly presented motion. But unlike criminal appeals, and despite the words used to describe the standard, trial judge’s abuse of discretion and the right to relief need not be clear.82 The record must clearly show what the trial judge did or failed to do, but the law need not be clear. Instead, the Supreme Court of Texas has explained that clarifying the law on issues that do not tend to arise in the ordinary appellate process is one of the benefits, if not purposes, of the ready availability of writs of mandamus.83 In civil cases, the law applicable to whether a trial judge abused their discretion may be unclear, but that lack of clarity is not a bar to the issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition as it might be in a criminal case.84 In sum, in civil cases, the first, “abuse of discretion” requirement often requires the court of appeals to conclude the trial court misapplied the applicable law, whatever the court of appeals eventually determines the law to be.

Conversely, the “no adequate remedy at law” and “no adequate remedy by appeal” standards very different. On this requirement, the Supreme Court of Texas’s jurisprudence has evolved so radically that the “no adequate remedy by appeal” standard in civil cases has become synonymous with there simply being no

79 In re Hesse, 552 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, orig. proceeding).
80 In re State ex rel. Escamilla, No. 03-18-00351-CV, 2018 WL 4844100, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 5, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
82 Id. at 135 (“[E]ven when the law is unsettled, the trial court’s refusal to enforce the jury waiver was a clear abuse of discretion.”)
83 Id. at 138 (stating mandamus is beneficial to address issues that generally evade the normal appellate process).
84 Id. at 135.
right to appeal.\textsuperscript{85} In other words, according to the supreme court’s most recent jurisprudence on this legal standard, if the Texas Legislature has provided a right of appeal, then a trial court’s ruling, order, or judgment might not be challenged in the court of appeals in an original proceeding seeking an extraordinary writ. But if the Legislature has declined to provide a right of appeal, a party may nevertheless seek review of the trial court’s ruling, but it must be done through the alternative original proceeding process (which is often preferable to the regular appellate process because it sometimes produces a faster result at less of a cost to the parties).\textsuperscript{86} In most cases in which the supreme court itself grants mandamus relief, it does not even address the second requirement, which sets a less stringent model for courts of appeals’ analyses.

This trend in the supreme court’s jurisprudence has essentially allowed every trial court ruling, order, or judgment in a civil case to be reviewable by the court of appeals in one way (by a direct appeal as a matter of right) or another (by a permissive appeal or an original proceeding in an appellate court). As a result, while there used to be some attempt to outline the specific rulings and orders for which an appeal was not an adequate remedy, and those for which an appeal was an adequate remedy, writs of mandamus and prohibition now simply represent the flip side of appealability.\textsuperscript{87} A party can obtain “extraordinary” relief in a civil case almost any time there is no right of appeal. In other words, for nearly every single ruling, order, or judgment a new judge might make or render, the order or judgment is either (1) an appealable final judgment or interlocutory as a matter of right, or (2) subject to the discretionary review proceedings of (a) a permissive appeal and (b) an original proceeding in an appellate court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.

\textbf{C. Conclusion}

In both civil and criminal cases, if a newly elected trial judge reconsiders a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment, the same general appellate options are available: direct appeals and original proceedings in the appellate courts seeking extraordinary relief. However, with the exception of writs of habeas corpus, trial court actions that are appealable and the standards governing obtaining relief in the appellate court, will differ based on whether the case is civil or criminal.

\textsuperscript{85} In re Sassin, 511 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, orig. proceeding) (“A non-party to a suit has no right to appeal a discovery order in that suit and therefore has no adequate remedy by appeal.”).


\textsuperscript{87} See, e.g., Justice Marialyn Barnard, Lorien Whyte & Emmanuel Garcia, \textit{Is My Case Mandamusable?: A Guide to the Current State of Texas Mandamus Law}, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143 (2014) (providing a non-exhaustive list of recent issues subject to mandamus); \textit{see also} In re Brown, No. 02-07-071-CV, 2007 WL 2460361, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining mandamus is an appropriate remedy when newly elected trial judge erroneously grants a motion for new trial).
III

RECONSIDERATION (“REHEARING”) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

This month, there was a change in judgeships for approximately one-third of justices in the courts of appeals.88 Similar questions about reconsideration on appeal can arise with a change in judgeship on the courts of appeals. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide two methods for reconsideration or “rehearing” in the courts of appeals: a motion for panel rehearing and a motion for en banc reconsideration.89 This Part addresses those options in the court of appeals when there is a change in judgeship. This Part also addresses the timeliness for such motions, but begins with a few notes about the terminology used by this article and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (or TRAPs).

A. Terminology

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure refer to “motions for rehearing,” “motions for en banc reconsideration,” and motions for “rehearing en banc.”90 The TRAP Rules use “en banc rehearing” and “en banc reconsideration” interchangeably,91 and both of these terms refer to the same type of motion: a motion for rehearing addressed to the en banc court. Unless context indicates a narrower meaning, a “motion for rehearing” includes both a motion for panel rehearing and a motion for en banc rehearing.92 Some TRAP rules refer to a “motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration,” indicating that “motion for rehearing” refers to a motion for panel rehearing.93 For clarity, this article refers to panel motions as “motions for panel rehearing” and en banc motions as “motions for en banc rehearing.” Both motions for panel rehearing and motions for en banc rehearing are “motions for rehearing”; the primary difference is that motions for en banc rehearing are addressed to the en banc court and ask the en banc court to reconsider the panel’s opinion and judgment.

B. Reconsideration of Orders that Do Not Dispose of the Appeal

Most of this Part addresses traditional motions for panel and en banc rehearing that are filed after a court of appeals has issued an order or judgment disposing of an appeal with a written opinion. The TRAP Rules regarding motions for panel and en banc rehearing contemplate that a motion for rehearing will be filed after the

88 See supra n.1.
89 See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.1, 49.8.
90 See id.
92 See TEX. R. APP. P. 49, cmt. to 2008 change (“Rule 49 is revised to treat a motion for en banc reconsideration as a motion for rehearing and to include procedures governing the filing of a motion for en banc reconsideration.”).
93 Id. R. 49.6, 49.7, 49.8, 49.11.
court of appeals issues its opinion and disposes of the appeal. However, Texas appellate courts have traditionally entertained motions to reconsider other orders that do not dispose of the appeal. It is unclear whether such motions to reconsider are governed by the TRAP Rules that specifically govern “motions for rehearing.” Although a court of appeals can reconsider and vacate orders while it retains plenary power over an appeal, it is not clear what rules and timelines—if any—govern motions to reconsider orders that do not dispose of the appeal. The rest of this Part addresses motions for panel and en banc rehearing of a judgment or order that disposes of an appeal with a written opinion.

C. Timeliness

TRAP Rule 49 provides deadlines for both a motion for panel rehearing and a motion for en banc rehearing. A motion for panel rehearing “may be filed within 15 days after the court of appeals’ judgment or order is rendered.” Similarly, a motion for en banc rehearing “must be filed within 15 days after the court of appeals’ judgment or order, or when permitted, within 15 days after the court of appeals’ denial of the party’s last timely filed motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration.” After a “motion for rehearing” is ruled on, “a further motion for rehearing may be filed within 15 days of the court’s [ruling] if the court” changes its opinion or judgment. "A motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration may be amended as a matter of right any time before the 15-day period allowed for filing the motion expires, and with leave of the court, any time before the court of appeals decides the motion.”

Rule 49.8 provides a party may file a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for panel and/or en banc rehearing “no later than 15 days after the last date for filing the motion.” The motion must comply with the requirements for all motions for an extension of time, which are set out in Rule 10.5(b). Thus, reading Rule 49.8 together with the other provisions of Rule 49, a party may file a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for panel or en banc rehearing up to 30 days after the court of appeals’ judgment or order is rendered. Unlike other rules

---

94 This appears to be the intent of Rule 49 when all provisions are construed as a whole. Also, structurally, the rules are numbered in a sequence in which appeals generally proceed chronologically. See generally id. R. 20 (starting with initial filing fees and indigence) to R. 51 (ending with enforcement of judgment after mandate issues).
95 Id. R. 49.1, 49.7, 49.8.
96 Id. R. 49.1.
97 Id. R. 49.7.
98 Id. R. 49.5. Nothing in Rule 49 indicates that 49.5’s uses “motion to rehearing” to refer only to motions for panel rehearing. Rather, a comment to the rule states, “Rule 49 is revised to treat a motion for en banc reconsideration as a motion for rehearing and to include procedures governing the filing of a motion for en banc reconsideration.” Id. R. 49.5, cmt. to 2008 change.
99 Id. R. 49.6.
100 Id. R. 49.8.
101 Id. R. 10.5.
regarding motions for an extension, the motion for panel or en banc rehearing need not necessarily be filed with the motion for an extension.102

D. Motions for Panel Rehearing

When it comes to a change in judgeship on the court of appeals, different rules might apply to motions for panel rehearing than the rules that apply to motions for en banc rehearing. Most significantly, Rule 49.3 appears to limit a newly elected judge’s authority to vote to grant a motion for panel rehearing. Rule 49.3 provides, “A motion for rehearing may be granted by a majority of the justices who participated in the decision of the case. Otherwise, it must be denied.”103 For cases decided by a panel with a former judge, the newly elected judge will not have “participated in the decision of the case.”

One implication Rule 49.3 is that a change in judgeship can actually hurt one’s chances of obtaining relief via a motion for panel rehearing. A newly elected judge’s vote cannot count toward a majority required to grant the motion for panel rehearing, and the outgoing justice is unable to reconsider the case. Instead, in order for a motion for panel rehearing to be granted when there is a change in judgeship, the two remaining justices who participated in the decision of the case must both vote to grant the motion for rehearing. Otherwise, the motion for panel rehearing must be denied.104 If there is only one new justice on the panel, a change in judgeship can reduce the chances of relief being granted on the motion for rehearing if the former justice was more likely to have voted to grant the motion for rehearing. And, it seems to be a logical consequence of Rule 49.3 that if more than one justice on the panel is now a former justice, the motion for panel rehearing likely cannot be granted under Rule 49.

One plausible workaround of Rule 49.3’s limit on motions for panel rehearing is when a motion for panel rehearing convinces the panel, with the newly elected justice or justices, to grant rehearing on its own motion. By its plain terms, Rule 49.3 only limits when a “motion” for rehearing may be granted and when the motion must be denied. However, under Rule 19.2, “the court of appeals retains plenary power to vacate or modify its judgment” while the court of appeals has plenary power.105 If the court of appeals vacates its judgment, the appeal remains pending in the court of appeals and the panel must proceed to issue a new judgment, which may or may not be the same as the prior judgment. However, a panel of newly elected justices might be unlikely to review the prior panel’s decisions without an issue being brought to the panel’s attention.

That said, if a panel cannot, as a matter of law, grant a motion for panel rehearing, the filing may be considered frivolous. Rule 3.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (TDRPC) prohibits a lawyer from

---

102 Compare id. R. 49.8, with id. R. 10.5(b)(2) (allowing a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal), and R. 26.3 (authoring the appellate court to extend time to file a notice of appeal if the party has also filed the notice of appeal).

103 Id. R. 49.3

104 See id. R (requiring majority to grant, “Otherwise, it must be denied.”)

105 Id. R. 19.2.
“bring[ing] or defend[ing] a proceeding, or assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”\textsuperscript{106} A filing “is frivolous if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument that the action taken is consistent with existing law or that it may be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”\textsuperscript{107} A party filing a motion for rehearing addressed to a panel with more than one justice who did not participate in the decision of the case might be unable to believe in good faith that the request could be granted due to Rule 49.3. But Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 allows for most rules to be suspended for good cause. If there is a good faith belief that good cause exists under TRAP Rule 2 for suspending TRAP Rule 49.3, then depending upon the facts of the case, the ethical obligation in TDRPC Rule 3.01 might be satisfied.

There are a couple caveats about TRAP Rule 2. First, court of appeals rarely use Rule 2 because the TRAP Rules generally provide the standard procedure for appeals. Second, the use of Rule 2 might be even less viable in criminal appeals. Generally, in civil appeals, “good cause” has been construed broadly.\textsuperscript{108} But for criminal appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that “to expedite a case or other good cause” does not justify “lengthen[ing] procedural time limits . . . even in an effort to protect the substantive rights of litigants.”\textsuperscript{109} As a result, in criminal appeals, Rule 2 generally might be unavailable to alter procedures that would lengthen the duration of the appeal “absent truly extraordinary circumstances.”\textsuperscript{110}

E. Motions for En Banc Rehearing

Although Rule 49.3 applies to “motions to rehearing,” and a “motion for rehearing” generally includes a motion for en banc rehearing, Rule 49.3 likely does not apply to all motions for en banc rehearing. Rule 49.3 limits when a motion for rehearing may be granted by justices who participated in the decision of the case. Unlike Rule 49.3, Rule 49.7, which governs en banc motions, provides: “While the court has plenary power, a majority of the en banc court may, with or without a motion, order en banc reconsideration of a panel’s decision.”\textsuperscript{111} Motions for en banc rehearing are typically addressed to and often decided by justices who did not participate in the decision of the case (i.e. the justices who were not on the panel). It therefore seems Rule 49.3 applies only to motions for rehearing addressed to the panel that participated in the decision of the case or to the en banc court when the en banc court decided the case initially.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{TEX. DISC. R. PROF. CONDUCT} 3.01. \\
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} cmt. 2. \\
\textsuperscript{108} See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (holding TRAP Rules should be liberally construed so that the right of appeal is not lost); Mills v. Haggard, 17 S.W.3d 462, 463 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (applying good cause standard under TRAP Rule 2). \\
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.} at 360. \\
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{TEX. R. APP. P.} 49.7.
If a newly elected justice substitutes in for a justice who did participate in the decision of the case, Rule 49.3 does not appear to preclude the new justice’s vote from being considered part of the majority of the court for an en banc motion because 49.7 is more specific to en banc motions and does not contain Rule 49.3’s restriction. Reading Rule 49.3 otherwise would seem to effectively prohibit en banc reconsideration of a panel decision because the other justices did not participate in the decision of the case. Consequently, even if a newly elected justice’s vote might not count towards a majority in considering a motion for panel rehearing, a newly elected justice’s vote would might count toward the majority for a motion for en banc rehearing.

Unlike a motion for panel rehearing, which is typically more appropriate for identifying clear errors by a panel, motions for en banc rehearing are generally regarded as requiring something more than a mere error. For example, Rule 41.2, which might appear to govern en banc consideration of a case in the first instance (as opposed to the case being first decided by a panel), provides that “en banc consideration of a case is not favored and should not be ordered unless necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions or unless extraordinary circumstances require en banc consideration.”112 As a form of consideration of a case, en banc reconsideration is regarded by some as being subject to Rule 41.2’s requirements.113 As a practical matter, it might not be clear to the en banc court until after a panel decides a case, that the panel’s decision is not in uniformity with prior decisions of the court or that the case presents circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to justify the resources of the en banc court.

When a court of appeals is determining whether to reconsider a case en banc, the court might determine whether the panel’s decision conflicts with a prior decision of the court or whether other extraordinary circumstances justify en banc rehearing. And court of appeals justices might have widely differing views of what constitutes extraordinary circumstances or a sufficient lack of uniformity. In light of Rule 41.2’s express statement that en banc consideration is “disfavored,”114 the “uniformity” and “extraordinary circumstances” bases for en banc rehearing might be narrowly construed. Such a narrow construction might include, for uniformity, a panel’s holding that conflicts directly with a holding of the court in a prior case and, for extraordinary circumstances, the inability of the panel to obtain a majority on the reasoning for its decision115 or a panel error that will either likely impact the case substantially in its subsequent phases or result in a significant loss to the non-prevailing party.

112 Id. R. 41.2(c)

113 See, e.g., Guimaraes v. Brann, No. 01-16-00093-CV, 2018 WL 6696769, at *22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2018, no pet. h.) (Keyes, J., dissenting to denial of en banc reconsideration) (“I conclude that the case fully satisfies the requirements for en banc reconsideration set out in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41.2(c).”).

114 TEX. R. APP. P. 41.2(c).

115 If a panel cannot agree on the judgment, then the case may go en banc if there are more than three justices on the court. See id. R. 41.1(b). If a majority of the en banc court cannot agree on a judgment, the chief justice must request appointment of a visiting justice. See id. R. 41.2(b).
F. Conclusion

In the vast majority of cases in which any motion for rehearing is filed, the motion is ultimately denied. When there is a change in judgeship on the court of appeals, this might in some cases further reduce the likelihood of success for a motion for panel or en banc rehearing. Newly elected justices’ votes toward a motion for panel rehearing might not count toward a majority needed to grant the motion for panel rehearing, although the panel might be able to grant rehearing on its own motion. And for a motion for en banc rehearing, newly elected justices might either be disinclined to start reviewing decisions of their predecessors, or they might take a narrow view of what is sufficient to justify the resources of the en banc court to review a previously decided case.

That said, there has been some success in filing a motion for en banc reconsideration with an appellate court that has newly elected judges. In *State v. Rosenbaum*, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided a case by a vote of five to four. The following month, two judges left the court and were replaced by two newly elected judges. The newly constituted court granted a motion for rehearing, adopted the dissenting opinion, and flipped the prior judgment of the court. *Rosenbaum* shows that newly elected judges may flip a prior decision of the court by granting a motion for rehearing.

Even if an appellate court with newly elected justice is unlikely to grant a motion for panel or en banc rehearing, further appellate options include filing a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas in civil appeals, or a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal appeals. A motion for panel or en banc rehearing in the court of appeals “is not a prerequisite to filing a petition for review in the Supreme Court or a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Such motions are also not required to preserve error for further review.

IV SPECIAL APPLICATIONS & MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Although a change in judgeship generally does not change the appellate remedies that are usually available, it can affect how those appellate remedies are pursued. This Part addresses how a change in judgeship can change or alter the typical course of procedures in appellate courts.

---

117 *Id.*
118 *Id.*
119 *See id.*
120 TEX. R. APP. P. 49.9.
121 *Id.*
A. Newly elected trial judges usually must reconsider a prior judge’s ruling before an appellate court will issue an extraordinary writ, such as mandamus.

In Part I, which addresses reconsideration in the trial court, this article notes that if error has been preserved with the former judge, the issue need not be preserved again with the new judge for error to be preserved on appeal. This is true for the ordinary appellate process because the law generally treats the trial court as an office and does not distinguish between officeholders. Writs are different.

1. Automatic Substitution of Judges under Rule 7.2

Elected judges are public officers. Under Rule 7.2(a), “When a public officer is a party in an official capacity to an appeal or original proceeding, and if that person ceases to hold office before the appeal or original proceeding is finally disposed of, the public officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party if appropriate.”122 Extraordinary writs, such as writs of mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus, are directed to the individual holding the office. Extraordinary writ proceedings in the appellate courts are “original” proceedings, which means that while they directly relate to the proceedings in the trial court, the proceeding and the parties are different.123 The parties in an original proceeding are the relator—the party seeking relief—and the respondent—the public official against whom relief is sought, as well as the real party in interest.124 Because an extraordinary writ is addressed to the individual officeholder to correct that officeholder’s failure to carry out their duties, extraordinary relief usually cannot be granted against an officeholder who did not abuse their discretion. The Supreme Court of Texas explained in In re Blevins, “Although a particular respondent is not critical in a mandamus proceeding, the writ must be directed to someone. And generally a writ will not issue against one judge for what another did.”125

If a petition for an extraordinary writ has been filed in the court of appeals, and the individual holding the office of the trial court changes, the new judge is automatically substituted for the prior judge, and the court of appeals abates the original proceeding under Rule 7.2(b) for the newly elected trial judge to reconsider the ruling, order, or judgment. Rule 7.2(b) provides, “If the case is an original proceeding . . . the court must abate the proceeding to allow the successor to reconsider the original party’s decision. In all other cases, the suit will not abate, and the successor will be bound by the appellate court’s judgment or order as if the successor were the original party.”126 If the newly elected trial judge vacates or changes the ruling, order, or judgment, then the court of appeals will typically dismiss the original proceeding as moot.127 If the newly elected trial judge does not

---

122 TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).
123 See id. R. § 3 (“Original Proceedings in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals”).
124 Id. R. 3.1(h)(2).
125 480 S.W.3d 542, 543 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citation omitted).
126 TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(b).
vacate or change the ruling, order, or judgment, then the original proceeding in the court of appeals does not become moot and will be reinstated.\textsuperscript{128} The proceeding will remain in the court of appeals until the court disposes of the petition.

If the original proceeding continues in the court of appeals after the new trial judge takes office, then the new judge “is automatically substituted as a party if appropriate” under TRAP Rule 7.2.\textsuperscript{129} Although the substitution should occur automatically, the relator may request that the new judge be substituted in the former judge’s stead. But even if the proceedings following substitution are not in the name of the substituted party, “any misnomer that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties may be disregarded. Substitution may be ordered at any time, but failure to order substitution of the successor does not affect the substitution.”\textsuperscript{130}

This discussion assumes, however, that the petition for an extraordinary writ is filed in the appellate court before the prior judge leaves office.

2. Petition Not Filed Before Prior Judge Leaves Office

The proper procedure is not immediately apparent for when a trial judge issues an order for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal and an adversely affected party does not file a petition for an extraordinary writ before that judge leaves office. Suppose, for example, Judge Pryor abuses her discretion and signs a non-appealable order on December 31st, and Judge Nu succeeds Judge Pryor and takes office on January 1st. A party contemplating filing a petition for writ of mandamus likely cannot, in good faith, request that court of appeals issue a writ of mandamus directing Judge Pryor to vacate the order because Judge Pryor is no longer able to exercise authority as a judge of the court. Conversely, the Supreme Court of Texas has stated unequivocally that “[m]andamus will not issue against a new judge for what a former one did.”\textsuperscript{131} And, Rule 7.2’s automatic substitution rule appears to apply only “[w]hen a public officer is a party in an official capacity to an appeal or original proceeding, and . . . that person ceases to hold office before the appeal or original proceeding is finally disposed of.”\textsuperscript{132} Because most extraordinary writs are generally governed by equitable principles, this situation likely does not leave an adversely affected party without any remedy at all. The answer might ultimately differ depending on whether the case is civil or criminal. In civil cases, extraordinary writs are extraordinarily flexible; but significantly less so in criminal cases.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{128} In re Xeller, 6 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
\textsuperscript{129} TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).
\textsuperscript{130} Id.
\textsuperscript{131} In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Tex. 2008)
\textsuperscript{132} TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).
\textsuperscript{133} In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding))
In a civil case, *In re Newby*, the court of appeals addressed a similar situation when a trial judge had been indefinitely suspended.\(^{134}\) The court addressed the issue in the failure-to-rule context as follows:

> Here relator asks us to order Judge McCoy to rule on pending motions. But this is not possible since, under current circumstances, Judge Forbis and not Judge McCoy will preside over relator’s case in the 100th District Court. The interests of the parties and judicial economy in the trial court and this court are not served if we merely await a final determination of Judge McCoy’s suspension. Under the unique facts at bar we find the purpose of Rule 7 is best served by substituting Judge Forbis as respondent and abating the case so that relator may present his complaints to Judge Forbis. By ordering abatement of this proceeding, we express no opinion concerning the form or merit of relator’s petition.\(^{135}\)

Thus, *In re Newby* shows that when a party might lack a remedy under traditional mandamus principles, a court in a civil case might relax the rules to serve the interests of the parties and judicial economy.\(^{136}\) However, in *In re Newby*, the court took judicial notice that a new judge had been appointed and taken office, and then substituted the new judge for the prior judge, and then abated for the new judge to consider the pending issues.\(^{137}\)

### 3. Mandamus vs. Permissive Reconsideration

In theory, an abatement of an original proceeding in the court of appeals appears to provide a possible opportunity to bypass a newly elected trial judge’s discretion not to reconsider a prior judge’s ruling. In a prior section, this article addresses permissive reconsideration of a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment, explaining that a new judge may exercise their discretion to refuse to reconsider a former judge’s rulings, orders, or judgments. But TRAP Rule 7.2 appears to require a new judge to reconsider a prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment.\(^{138}\) And even if Rule 7.2 did not apply, and a party were to file a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the former judge’s ruling, a court of appeals may nevertheless exercise its discretion to abate for the new judge to reconsider the merits of the prior judge’s ruling, order, or judgment.\(^{139}\)

When an appellate court abates an original proceeding for a new judge to reconsider, the appellate court may simply order a party to pursue reconsideration from new judge by a certain date. Alternatively, the appellate court might actually direct the trial judge to reconsider the challenged ruling, order, or judgment. For

---

\(^{134}\) 280 S.W.3d 298, 300 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (per curiam).

\(^{135}\) *Id.* at 300–01.

\(^{136}\) *Id.*

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at 301–02 (order on abatement) (per curiam).

\(^{138}\) TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(b).

\(^{139}\) In re Blevins, 480 S.W.3d 542, 544 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (stating court of appeals has discretion to either deny outright or abate for reconsideration).
example, in *In re Blevins*, the Supreme Court of Texas, apparently without a request from either party, ordered the following:

We direct the trial judge assigned to the case to take whatever actions and hold whatever hearings it determines are necessary for it to reconsider the [challenged] order and those matters underlying it. We do not intend to limit the trial court to considering only the evidence on which the [challenged] order was based. The trial court is directed to proceed in accordance with this opinion and, subject to any requests for extension of time by that court, cause its order on reconsideration of the [challenged] order to be filed with the clerk of this Court . . . .

And in *In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland*, the Supreme Court of Texas abated the original proceeding for the newly elected trial judge to reconsider the merits of a motion for new trial that the prior judge had granted. The supreme court noted in *Baylor Medical Center* that if the trial court had lost plenary power, mandamus could not issue to direct the trial judge take an action that the judge lacked the authority to take. However, as with permissive reconsideration, the supreme court concluded a trial judge should be able to reconsider any order so long as the trial court has plenary power.

Filing a petition for writ of mandamus in an appellate court when a new trial judge takes office might therefore be an alternative to seeking permissive reconsideration with the new judge. Such an attempt to bypass the trial judge’s discretion to refuse to reconsider a former judge’s ruling could raise an ethical issue in cases in which mandamus would clearly be inappropriate. As noted above, Disciplinary Rule 3.01 prohibits a lawyer from bringing a proceeding for which “the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument that the action taken is consistent with existing law or that it may be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” Here again, the assessment of frivolity will depend on whether the case is a civil case or a criminal case because the Supreme Court of Texas has all but eliminated the “no adequate remedy by appeal” requirement, whereas the Court of Criminal Appeals has not. For criminal appeals, there might be fewer rulings for which bringing a mandamus proceeding would be appropriate. But for civil cases, there are few rulings for which bringing a mandamus proceeding in an appellate court would be inappropriate. Unless there is a clear right of appeal for the objectionable ruling, order, or judgment, mandamus in a civil case might arguably be available. That said, an appellate court has the discretion, instead of abating for reconsideration by the new trial judge, to simply deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

Alternatively, a party could seek permissive reconsideration by the new trial judge before filing a petition for writ of mandamus. The procedure in such a case seems unclear, and this approach might have adverse consequences for a

140 Id.
141 280 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
142 Id. at 228.
143 TEX. DISC. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.01, cmt. 2.
subsequent mandamus proceeding. As an illustration, suppose Judge Pryor abuses her discretion and signs a non-appealable order, and then leaves office on December 31st. In January, a party files a motion for reconsideration, Judge Nu hears the motion, and then Judge Nu denies the motion for reconsideration, refusing to reconsider at all. In a petition for writ of mandamus, there would be two possible trial court orders to challenge: (1) Judge Pryor’s original order; and (2) Judge Nu’s order denying the motion for reconsideration of Judge Pryor’s order. Generally, a trial judge has no mandatory duty to reconsider a prior order of the court, and it might be difficult to view an order denying a motion to reconsider a prior order as an abuse of discretion. That does not preclude challenging the prior order as an abuse of discretion in an original proceeding in an appellate court. However, if the former judge has left office and cannot be directed to change the ruling, order, or judgment, the new judge has already declined to reconsider, and a petition for writ of mandamus has been filed in the appellate court, then the appellate court might simply deny the petition as opposed to abating for the trial judge to address the issue once again.

B. When the newly elected judge takes office, mandamus will not issue for a failure to rule without presenting the matter to the new judge.

In Part I, which concerns reconsideration in the trial court, this article notes that matters generally need not be presented again to a new judge for preservation of error purposes. But, as Part IV.A demonstrates, extraordinary writs and the original proceedings by which they are obtained are different because they are directed to the officeholder, not to the office. Consequently, when a prior judge has refused to rule on a motion, and a new judge takes office, the new officeholder has not necessarily abused their discretion and mandamus generally will be inappropriate until it is clear that the new judge has refused to rule on the motion within a reasonable time.

If the former judge refused to rule, and a new judge takes office, mandamus will not issue to require the new judge to rule until the relator presents the issue to the newly elected judge. This principle is demonstrated by In re Cooper.\textsuperscript{144} In Cooper, a former judge held a hearing on an application for temporary injunction on November 7th.\textsuperscript{145} The trial judge had not granted or denied the application by December 31st, when the judge left office.\textsuperscript{146} The party applying for a temporary injunction filed petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, seeking a writ to direct the newly elected trial judge to rule on the motion.\textsuperscript{147} The court of appeals denied the petition for writ of mandamus because the mandamus record did not show the application for temporary injunction had been presented to the newly elected judge.\textsuperscript{148} Cooper demonstrates that if a former judge abuses their discretion

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{144} In re Cooper, No. 05-07-00015-CV, 2007 WL 80590 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 11, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
\bibitem{145} Id. at *1.
\bibitem{146} Id.
\bibitem{147} Id.
\bibitem{148} Id.
\end{thebibliography}
or fails to execute their ministerial duties to rule on a properly presented motion, and if a new judge takes office, extraordinary relief in the court of appeals will generally be unavailable until the issue is presented to the new trial judge, and the new trial judge also abuses their discretion by failing to execute their ministerial duties to rule on a properly presented motion. 149

If a new judge hears and rules on motion that the former judge refused to rule on, then the new judge’s ruling will moot out any issue about the refusal to rule. This principle is demonstrated by *In re Hatley*. 150 In *Hatley*, the former judge refused to rule on a motion for post-conviction DNA testing. 151 The new judge ruled on the motion. 152 The court of appeals did not grant relief because it concluded that the new judge’s ruling on the motion mooted the complaint about the lack of a ruling. 153 Notably, the court in *Hatley* stated it was reinstating the mandamus proceeding, and the case history shows the court of appeals had abated the proceeding. 154 Although it is unclear from the short opinion in *Hatley* why the court had to reinstate the mandamus proceeding, it is possible (if not likely) that court of appeals abated the mandamus proceeding to give the new trial judge the opportunity to decide whether to rule on the motion. Even if *Hatley* does not itself support that a mandamus proceeding should be abated for the new trial judge to decide whether to rule, such a procedure might be an extension of *Blevins* and *Baylor Medical Center*.

If a former judge has refused to rule on a properly presented motion, a newly elected judge takes office, and a petition for writ of mandamus has not been filed in the court of appeals, then *Cooper* suggests the proper procedure is to present the request for relief to the new trial judge before seeking mandamus relief. If a former judge has refused to rule on a properly presented motion, a petition for writ of mandamus has been filed in the court of appeals, and a newly elected judge takes office, it appears the court of appeals may (consistent with *Blevins* and *Baylor Medical Center*) either follow *Cooper* and deny relief or follow *Hatley* and abate the mandamus proceeding for the new judge to have an opportunity to rule on the motion.

C. When a former judge was the factfinder at a bench trial in a civil case, and a newly elected judge takes office, the new judge cannot make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In Part I.A, this article explains that generally, the law treats the trial court as an office and does not distinguish between officeholders, and the newly elected judge may exercise the authority of the court to the same extent the former judge could have if the former judge were still in office. Part IV.A notes that original

---

149 *Id.*
151 *Id.* at *1.
152 *Id.*
153 *Id.*
154 *Id.*
proceedings are one exception to this general rule. Findings of fact and conclusions of law after a civil bench trial present another exception.

The newly elected judge cannot make findings of fact and conclusions of law if the new judge did not preside at trial, but the former judge might retain the authority to do so even after the judge has left office. This principle was articulated recently by the Supreme Court of Texas in *Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak*. In *Ad Villarai*, the former trial judge lost the primary election to the new judge, and then presided over a bench trial in the case in October and rendered a final judgment on November 24th. The proper procedure for obtaining findings of fact and conclusions of law was followed before the judge left office. The primary challenger won the general election and took office on January 1st. The new judge reviewed the record and timely made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that neither judge had the authority to make findings of fact and conclusion of law.

The supreme court agreed the new judge lacked the authority to make the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but disagreed as to the former judge. The supreme court first rejected the applicability of TRCP Rule 18 and Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 30.002(b) because they govern when a trial judge dies, resigns, or is disabled. The supreme court held that under 30.002(a), however, that the former judge retained the authority to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in the case, even if the trial court’s plenary power had expired. The supreme court noted that under section 30.002(a), a former judge who has left office may file findings of fact and conclusions of law if the end of the former judge’s term falls within the forty-day period to file findings of fact and conclusion of law under the applicable rules of civil procedure. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case to that court with instructions for that court to abate the appeal and to direct the new judge to request that the former judge make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

155 519 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam)
156 *Ad Villarai*, 519 S.W.3d at 136.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 137–43
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See 4 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, TEX. CIV. PRAC. § 20:12 (2d. ed.). (“[C]ommon sense suggests that reliable findings and conclusions can not be obtained from a judge who did not try the case, and some case authority suggests that in this situation reversal and remand is the appropriate remedy.”). It appears that the remedy for when findings of fact and conclusions of law cannot be obtained is a reversal and remand for a new trial. Corpus Christi Hous. Auth. v. Esquivel, No. 13-10-00145-CV, 2011 WL 2395461, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 9, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. v. Laca, 243 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (“Because the judge who handled the case has been replaced as the result of an election, we must reverse and remand the case for a new trial.”); Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 442 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Morris, 782 S.W.2d 521,
Ad Villarai involved a bench trial, and it is unclear whether the same rules would apply to hearings on pretrial matters involving disputed factual matters. Initially, the procedure provided in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law is not mandatory except for a bench trial.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, while there generally may be only one trial on the merits in a civil and criminal case, a trial court has the authority to reconsider previously decided pre-trial matters. Ad Villarai also involved preserved complaints about the authority and propriety of a former judge and a new judge making findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is unclear whether an appellate court is bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law that were made by the wrong judge and a complaint for appeal is not preserved. For example, in \textit{AmWest Savings Association v. Winchester}, the court of appeals noted that the newly elected judge made findings of fact and conclusion of law on the appellees’ affirmative defenses three months after trial.\textsuperscript{166} \textit{AmWest Savings}’s case history shows the trial in the case occurred on November 28th. The court of appeals proceeded to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings on the appellees’ affirmative defenses.\textsuperscript{167}

Considering Ad Villarai, the Fort Worth court of appeals recently addressed whether a newly elected judge may set aside findings from a jury trial over which the former judge presided. In \textit{Estate of Luce}, the court of appeals rejected a challenge to a newly elected judge setting aside jury findings from a trial over which the new judge did not preside.\textsuperscript{168} The court distinguished Ad Villarai because the case at bar did not involve findings of fact and conclusions of law or the new trial judge deciding disputed factual matters.\textsuperscript{169} The court in \textit{Luce} explained that because the new judge was making a legal determination about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s findings, \textit{Ad Villarai} did not control and the decision fell within the new judge’s authority as the judge of the trial court.\textsuperscript{170}

It appears that \textit{Ad Villarai} has very limited application. The procedure the supreme court approved applies only if the procedure for obtaining findings and conclusions of law is properly followed and the former judge leaves before the end of the forty-day deadline to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, the limits on newly elected trial judge’s authority to making findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessarily the same when the prior judge

\textsuperscript{165} IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro–Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997).

\textsuperscript{166} No. 05-95-00374-CV, 1998 WL 51849 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 10, 1998, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

\textsuperscript{167} Id. at *2–6.

\textsuperscript{168} No. 02-17-00097-CV, 2018 WL 5993577, at *16–17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

\textsuperscript{169} Id.

\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 17. These holdings are consistent with other case law, under which a newly elected trial judge may preside over a retrial of a case when a court of appeals reverse and remands the case for a new trial. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{In re Marriage of Slanker}, No. 06-11-00029-CV, 2011 WL 5600568, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
dies, resigns, or becomes disabled. Additionally, as demonstrated by Estate of Luce, Ad Villarai does not appear to limit a newly elected trial judge’s authority in a civil case to make matter-of-law determinations while the trial court retains plenary power. And, of course, because Ad Villarai was a civil case governed by the rules of civil procedure and provisions of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, it might not be instructive necessarily for criminal cases.

D. In a civil case, if a trial judge presides over a trial and leaves office before rendering judgment, the judge may not thereafter render judgment and a new trial might be required.

What if a trial judge presides over a trial, but does not render a judgment before leaving office and being replaced by a successor? A court of appeals addressed this situation in Martinez v. Martinez. In Martinez, a district court judge presided over a trial. Before rendering a judgment in the case, the judge was replaced by a successor judge through an election. The prior judge, after leaving office, rendered a judgment. The court of appeals explained that “a district judge who has been properly replaced by a successor has the authority to sign a written judgment after he has been replaced, provided he heard the cause and entered his judgment in the docket sheet of the cause before the expiration of his term.” However, in Martinez, nothing in the appellate record indicated that the judge had rendered judgment before leaving office. The court of appeals reversed and set aside the judgment of the prior judge, and remanded for a new trial before the newly elected judge.

E. In a habeas corpus proceeding, a newly elected judge may make findings of fact and credibility determinations from a cold record.

Shifting between the civil and criminal contexts can sometimes seem like shifting between alternate universes. As noted above, a newly elected judge generally lacks discretion in a civil case to make findings of fact and conclusions of law from a cold record, at which the former judge presided. The same is not true in all criminal cases, where a trial judge (as well as the appellate courts) can make credibility determinations without live testimony. This principle is illustrated by Ex

---

171 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.002; TEX. R. CIV. P. 18.
172 759 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ).
173 Id. at 523
174 Id.
175 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
parte McBride. In McBride, Donna Ruth McBride was charged with and convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. McBride filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that she was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because her counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The trial judge made fact findings and a recommendation to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which is the ultimate finder of fact in certain habeas proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined the trial judge’s fact findings were insufficient, remanded the case for more findings, and remanded a second time for further findings. After the second remand, a newly elected trial judge took office, and the new judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law after reviewing the transcripts from the writ hearing. The new judge recommended that relief be granted, but the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded otherwise, reasoning that although it found the attorney’s explanation credible, there was no evidence that McBride informed her attorney or the trial judge that she desired to appeal. McBride shows how the criminal context can differ from the civil context on whether a newly elected trial judge can make findings of fact and conclusions of law when the former judge presided over and was a factfinder at a hearing where fact issues were disputed.

F. In a criminal case, a newly elected judge cannot refuse to enforce a plea agreement approved by the former trial judge.

Generally, a plea agreement between the prosecution and the defense that is accepted by the trial court is a binding contract, and the trial court must enforce the agreement. This principle is demonstrated by Wright v. State. In Wright, the defendant and the State reached a plea agreement, which was approved by the trial judge. The trial judge later rejected the plea agreement. A newly elected judge took office and also refused to enforce the plea agreement, and the case went to trial. The defendant was convicted. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction based on the jury’s verdict, rejecting the State’s argument that the new judge simply carried out the former judge’s disapproval of the agreement, which the State characterized as a withdrawal of its plea bargain offer. The court

---

180 Id. at *1.
181 Id.
182 Id. at *2.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at *2–4.
187 Id. at 592.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 592–93.
190 Id. at 593.
191 Id. at 594–95.
of appeals explained that once a plea agreement is reached by the parties and approved by a trial judge, the defendant is entitled to specific enforcement of the plea agreement. The court of appeals therefore reversed the judgment of the new trial judge and remanded with instructions to reinstate the defendant's plea of no contest to the charged offense and to re-sentence the defendant in accordance with the terms of the original plea agreement. Wright demonstrates that in a criminal case, a newly elected judge cannot refuse to enforce a plea agreement approved by the former judge, even when the former judge would have done the same.

G. A change in judgeship can affect the analysis of a defendant’s Speedy Trial claim.

A change in judgeship can result in a change in pace of the docket, which can affect the analysis of a speedy trial claim in a criminal case. This principle is demonstrated somewhat by Ennis v. State. In Ennis, the defendant complained on appeal that the numerous delays of his trial date violated his right to a speedy trial. Speedy trial claims are governed by balancing four factors under Barker v. Wingo, one of which is the reason for the delay. Deliberate delay by the State weighs heavily in favor in the defendant’s speedy trial claim, negligence weighs against the State moderately, but a reasonably explained delay does not weight against the State. In Ennis, the Dallas court of appeals rejected the defendant’s speedy trial claim, noting that the reason for the delay was docket overcrowding, which could be a result of State’s conduct. However, the court of appeals noted the newly elected judge had significantly reduced the overcrowding of the docket, so this factor did not weigh heavily against the State. Thus, Ennis demonstrates a change in judgeship can affect the analysis or weighing of the Barker factors when assessing a speedy trial claim.

H. A Note on Newly Elected Prosecutors

The cases involving newly elected officials in the judiciary include many cases related to newly elected prosecutors, who are part of the judicial branch in Texas. Many of the cases involved conflicts of interests from the newly elected prosecutor’s prior law practice; thus, the number of these cases suggests that one of the most significant legal concern for newly elected prosecutors will be conflicts

---

192 Id.
193 Id.
194 No. 05-97-01638-CR, 2000 WL 420709, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 19, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
195 Id. at *2–5.
196 Id. at *2.
197 Id. at *3.
198 Id.
199 Id.
issues. However, the newly elected prosecutor retains prosecutorial discretion to decline to prosecute existing cases, including those on appeal. This principle is demonstrated by State v. Rickhoff. The quo warranto proceeding was initiated by the District Attorney, who appealed after not prevailing in the trial court. While the case was on appeal, the newly elected District Attorney filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal over the former District Attorney’s objection. The court of appeals held the new District Attorney held the office, which had the authority to discontinue the prosecution of the appeal, even over the former District Attorney’s objection. The court of appeals granted the new District Attorney’s motion and dismissed the appeal.

V CONCLUSION

With the significant number of new trial and appellate court judges who recently took office, a significant percentage of Texas’s judges is relatively new, especially in courts in the Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and Austin areas. Although the significant number of judges itself does not increase or decrease the appellate options available, a change in judgeship may affect whether and how the existing appellate options are pursued in civil and criminal cases. As with all conduct in court, attorneys should consider their ethical obligations in pursuing their appellate options with Texas’s transitioning judiciary.

201 648 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ).
202 Id. at 409.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.